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Abstract 
 
The value of networks as an integral part of the explanation of entrepreneurial success is 
widely acknowledged. It is unclear, however, in what way certain networks influence the 
success of start-up companies. The question of this paper is: ‘in what way does the 
entrepreneur’s network contribute to the success of his start-up.’ The focus is on improving 
our understanding of the causal mechanisms between the strong versus weak tie effect on 
three core entrepreneurial processes affecting performance, i.e. the ability of the entrepreneur 
to discover opportunities, to get resources, and to gain legitimacy. The network benefits are 
not uniform, we explore two contingencies, i.e. uncertainty and time. The networks of 30 ICT 
start-ups in the Netherlands were (re)constructed on the basis of in-depth interviews with the 
founders and desk research. We draw conclusions about the benefits of a particular mix of 
strong and weak ties to the ability of the start-up to survive and to grow.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Start-up firms are usually short of a complete set of skills and resources, they typically pursue 
small and highly uncertain opportunities, that are unproven and require little capital (Bhide, 
2000). Instead of high-powered venture capitalists and customer-friendly banks, they have to 
rely upon asset parsimony and creativity in serving customers, often persuade friends and 
family to invest in them. Some of these entrepreneurial companies even lack a business plan 
from the start and only later, when some innovative ideas have popped up and investors have 
expressed their interest, business plan are written and grand ambitions are expressed. Besides 
the lone and creative starters struggling to survive and searching actively for business, there 
are other categories of nascent entrepreneurs which are kick-started in setting up shop, due to 
a supportive source (or mother) organisation or a specialised incubator. Both former 
employers and professional start-up facilitators assist the entrepreneur(s) in his (their) early 
stages by providing capital, coaching, rolling contracts, referrals to new customers, suppliers, 
hence reducing the firm’s liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). New corporations 
typically lack stable relationships and sufficient resources from the beginning, but spin-offs 
and incubates, applying a don’t go it alone logic have privileged access to resources and all 
kind of strategic partnerships, due to their affiliation with their mother or incubator 
organisation (Baum et al., 2000).  
 
The lone inventor-entrepreneur acting on his/her own behalf in the search for new 
combinations, spotting new market opportunities and striving for profit maximisation, tells only 
half of the story of (innovative) entrepreneurship. Granovetter (1995), for instance, has argued 
that economic activities are socially situated and cannot be explained by reference to 
individual motives alone; instead they depend critically on the robustness of the underlying 
social structure. Economic action usually takes place in complex social situations, where actors 
are related to each other in ongoing networks of (inter)personal and interorganisational 
relationships. Their face-to-face interactions and economic transactions are influenced by the 
larger social, political and cultural context; their pursuit of economic goals, for instance, is 
typically accompanied by that of such non-economic (i.e. socio-political) ones such as 
sociability, recognition and approval, status, and power. Like any other economic actor, also 
entrepreneurs are embedded in social networks which provide access to critical resources (e.g. 
information, capital, customers). Aldrich & Zimmer (1986) have defined entrepreneurship as 
the situational exchange of resources and opportunities, which are embedded in ongoing 
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social relations. Those emergent economic linkages are channeled and facilitated or 
constrained and inhibited by the entrepreneur’s position in larger social networks.  
 
In explaining the success of a (new) company, it is therefore not only the qualities of the 
entrepreneur that play a large role, but also the social network(s) in which the entrepreneur(s) 
and his/their company is operating. A network is one of the most powerful assets that any 
individual can possess: it provides access to information, opportunities, power and to other 
networks (Uzzi, 1996; 1997). An alternative term for this whole set of active connections 
among people and organisations, which seems to be en vogue today, is ‘social capital’ 
(Davidsson & Honig, in press). More specifically, for Cohen & Prusak (2001: 4) social capital 
includes the trust, the mutual understanding, shared values and behaviour that not only bind 
the members of interpersonal networks and communities, but also facilitate cooperative 
action. The link between the entrepreneur and his contact network and success is not 
straightforward. On the one hand, a high level of social capital (i.e. dense social networks) 
will generate positive results, contributing to more intensive knowledge sharing, lowering 
transaction costs and turnover rates and promoting greater coherence of action. On the other 
hand, social capital is not the key to organizational success, or more precise, it can be even be 
neutral or even detrimental to a firm’s success. Some organisations succeed, despite the 
negative effects of low social capital (e.g. universities, consultancies); others collapsed 
because of poor market decisions and strategic errors, despite being known for their 
collegiality and employee commitment. Or even more to the extreme, the ties that bind can 
also be the ties that blind (Cohen & Prusak 2001: 14): ‘cohesive and tightly integrated 
communities can become a problem if that makes it clannish, insular, or even corrupt.’ 
 
The core question in this research project is the following: ‘In what way does the 
entrepreneur’s network contribute to the success of the starting company.’ The network seems 
to be important when it comes to discover opportunities, to acquiring knowledge and 
resources and to gain legitimacy. In the literature, however, it is unclear in what way a certain 
network configuration influences the success of a start-up company in terms of structure 
(dense/thin) and the type of relations (strong/weak). There are, for example, conflicting 
results: ‘both strong and weak ties are argued to be positively related to performance’(Rowley 
et al., 2000, p. 369) and in some cases strong ties are considered a disadvantage rather than a 
benefit (Gargiulo and Benassi, 1999). Efforts have been made to reconcile these opposing 
views. For example, Burt (2000) argues that they are not necessarily conflicting, but they play 
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different roles, which are valuable for different populations or purposes. There are 
contingencies and the question arises what type of network under what circumstances will 
contribute positively to the success of a starter. Two contingencies will be reviewed on basis 
of our empirical material. First, the degree of uncertainty. Higher uncertainty about the 
business model of the start-up increases the benefits of structural holes (Podolny, 2001) and 
weak ties (Hansen, 1999). Weak ties and structural holes provide access to new information 
and high uncertainty about a business model requires extensive search for information to 
discover opportunities for new ways to combine resources in order to satisfy demand. 
Podolny refers to this of uncertainty as egocentric uncertainty, which is different form alter-
centric uncertainty. The latter deals with the uncertainty of others, such as consumers and 
potential alliance partners, about the start-up. This type of uncertainty is closely related to 
legitimacy and a start-up lacking legitimacy will benefit from strong ties to an organization 
with reputation. The second contingency refers to time, in particular the different network 
requirements between emerging start-ups and firms in their early growth stage. Hite and 
Hesterly (2001) argue that in the emergence phase start-ups benefit most from strong ties. In 
that phase they need a ‘friends favor’ concerning access to resources. The advantages of weak 
ties and structural holes only become relevant later on in the early growth stage. In that stage 
start-ups have to explore ways to grow in new markets or products.   
 
It is our aim to gain insight into what the causal mechanisms from network to start-up success 
look like. In short, ‘how exactly is that possible positive network effect brought about’, and 
‘what are the sources of that network effect’ are two core questions we will address in this 
research. It is difficult to relate the network benefits directly to performance, therefore we 
distinguish three core entrepreneurial processes from the literature as discussed above, that are 
directly affected by the presence of weak or strong ties. These three processes may be seen as 
intervening processes that regulate the key performance indicators. The three entrepreneurial 
processes are: to discover opportunities, to secure resources and to gain legitimacy. 
 
In order to answer the research questions, we constructed the networks of 30 ICT start-ups in 
the Netherlands. Through interviews with the founders of 30 ICT/Internet-companies and 
through desk research we have (re)constructed the evolving networks of all the start-ups in 
‘mini-cases’ and have analysed them in terms of their contribution to the firm’s (lack of) 
success. A distinction was made between three types of initial network conditions. (1) 
lonesome cowboys: this category of ICT-start-ups includes companies that appear as if from 
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nowhere and emerge without substantial support from partners in the ICT community; (2) 
spin-offs/spin-outs: this second category consists of ICT-start-ups that in some way have been 
given support when they were founded from their former employer(s) (e.g. in training and 
coaching, housing, contract research, financing, etc.); and (3) incubator-driven companies: 
the third category is created, founded and built within a strategic network of (potential) 
partners and professional service providers, created as such by a specialised incubator.  
 
On basis of this research design we are able to examine the two research questions and review 
the contingencies. Interviews are suited to investigate the various network benefits and get 
detailed insights how these benefits contribute to the core entrepreneurial processes. 
Concerning the contingencies we have chosen start-ups with wide variations in terms of 
egocentric uncertainty, partly reflected in variations in the degree of innovativeness, ranging 
from radical to incremental. In addition, distinguishing different type of initial network 
conditions allows us to examine how this initial situation affects networking behavior in the 
initial period of existence and get detailed information whether and how particular network 
benefits contribute to the entrepreneurial processes.  
 
 
NETWORKS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL PROCESSES 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
 
In the existing literature on entrepreneurship the importance of having a solid network, in 
addition to the personal qualities of the entrepreneur, is emphasized as being one of the 
factors influencing the achievement of starters. In this research we emphasize the influence of 
the entrepreneur’s network on the achievements of the starting company. The network is 
important to obtain knowledge, complementary means and legitimacy. Until the mid-1990s, 
most network studies established a simple causal relation between the size of the network and 
the success of the starter (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Larson & Starr, 1993). Recently, 
however, more and more qualifications are being brought forward that indicate that the 
relation is not that simple, nor does it necessarily have to be positive. Steier & Greenwood 
(2000), for instance, introduced the term ‘network overload’. At a certain size the network no 
longer has a positive impact on the success of the starter, and may even be negative. The 
positive effect of a number of relations is cancelled by the amount of extra time needed to 
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maintain new relations. To limit the danger of ‘network overload’ an entrepreneur may 
benefit from an incubator, since the incubator provides him with access to a new network. 
Another study (Stuart et al., 1999) suggests that it is not so much the size of the network as its 
quality and reputation that have a positive influence on the success of start-ups. In addition, 
various studies introduce contingencies, for example with regard to the branch in which the 
starter is operating. Research conducted by Rowley et alia (2000) shows that a network with 
strong and close relationships has a positive effect on the achievements of starters in a stable 
industry, but a negative impact on the success of starters in a dynamic market. Research on 
‘social capital’ has yielded similar results. The analysis presented by Gargiulo & Benassis 
(1999), ominously called The dark side of social capital, shows that an existing network with 
close ties can inhibit the search for new opportunities and therefore have a negative impact on 
the success of a start-up in a dynamic market. 
 
The structure of networks may vary from a loose collection of ties to close-knit business 
groups, in which the focal organization is embedded. In this explorative study, a choice has 
been made for the effect of a particular mix of strong and weak ties in entrepreneurial 
networks, because this mix allows for an analysis of support networks in terms of both the 
depth and width of relationships. Granovetter (1995) has specified the intensity and diversity 
of relationships, i.e. the difference between strong and weak ties, on the basis of four criteria: 
namely, the frequency of contacts, the emotional intensity of the relationship, the degree of 
intimacy and reciprocal commitments between the actors involved. While weak ties provide 
access to (new) industry information and to new business contacts, strong tries are relations 
one can rely upon both in good times and in bad times. Strong ties tend to bind similar people 
in longer-term and intense relationships. Affective ties with close friends and family members 
may provide a shortcut to or even preclude the search for useful knowledge and access to 
critical resources. In other words, strong ties contribute to ‘economies of time’ (Uzzi, 1997: 
49): the ability to capitalize quickly on market opportunities. The manifestation of strong 
bonds will also reduce the time spent on monitoring and bargaining over agreements: free-
riding will be discouraged and transaction costs lowered. Strong ties are more likely to be 
useful to individuals in situations characterized by high levels of uncertainty and insecurity, 
e.g. amidst radical innovations. In such complex settings, individuals rely on close friends and 
family members for protection, uncertainty reduction and mutual learning. Krackhardt (1992: 
238) has elaborated on the affective component of strong ties by arguing that commitment, 
loyalty and friendship within an organization will be critical to an organization’s ability to 
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deal with major crises. In short, a relational governance structure based on strong ties will 
promote the development of trust, the transfer of fine-grained information and tacit 
knowledge, and joint problem-solving (Uzzi, 1996; 1997; Hansen, 1999; Rowley et al., 2000). 
In situations of high uncertainty researchers found not only benefits of strong ties, but also 
limitations.  The limitations concern the ability to discover information on opportunities to 
improve the business model of the start-up. In the initial stages start-ups continuously search 
for improvements in the way they combine resources in order to satisfy demand in a profitable 
way. In these situations of high egocentric uncertainty (Podolny, 2001), weak ties appear to be 
more beneficial than strong ties with regard to searching for new information. Essentially high 
egocentric uncertainty has different network benefits of the core processes of discovery of 
opportunities and securing of resources. The former profits most from weak ties, while the 
latter core entrepreneurial process benefits most from strong ties. 
 
Strong ties have other shortcomings as well. There is the risk of overembeddedness, i.e. of 
stifling economic performance (Uzzi, 1996). Close ties within and among business 
communities are vulnerable to exogenous shocks and may insulate such commitments from 
information that exists beyond their network.  
There is the danger of being blind to new developments or being 'locked-in' (Johannisson, 
2000). Weak ties refer to a diverse set of persons working in different contexts with whom 
one has some business connection and infrequent or irregular contact. These loose and non-
affective contacts increase diversity and may provide access to various sources of new 
information and offer opportunities to meet new people. Weak ties represent local bridges to 
disparate segments of the social network that are otherwise unconnected and may open the 
door to new options (Granovetter, 1995; Burt, 1992). In short, both strong and weak ties are 
useful and contribute to the emergence and growth of firms, although they are beneficial in 
different ways and at different stages of a company’s development (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003). 
Therefore, the ideal entrepreneurial network includes a particular mix of strong and weak 
relationships (Uzzi 1996; 1997). We have distinguished three entrepreneurial processes, the 
ability to discover opportunities, the ability to secure resources, and the ability to gain 
legitimacy, in which network ties play a role. 
 
In order to understand the causal mechanisms between start-up activity, the relevant network 
structure and performance, we will focus on the mix of weak and strong ties, each of them 
contributing in a particular way to the entrepreneurial process. Strong ties are associated with 
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the exchange of fine-grained information and tacit knowledge, trust-based governance, and 
resource cooptation (Rowley et al., 2000). Their advantages are different from the benefits 
generated by weak ties. Weak ties are beneficial as they provide access to novel information 
as they offer linkages to divergent regimes of the network (Burt, 1992). As strong and weak 
ties each have qualities, that are advantageous for different purposes we focus on the mix. 
Thereby we build on the work of Uzzi (1996) and Rowley et al. (2000) who conclude that a 
key issue in the determination of network benefits is the search for the optimal mix of strong 
and weak ties.  
 
On basis of a review of the literature, Hite and Hesterly (2001) propose that start-ups rely in 
the emerging phase primarily on their strong ties. And only later in the early growth stage 
they expand their network to include weak ties as well. The argument for the dependence on 
strong ties has to do with the high level of altercentric uncertainty of the new venture 
(Podolny, 2001). Strong ties are willing to provide the resources despite the uncertainty, while 
weak ties tend not to take the risk associated with the uncertain future of the start-up. 
Furthermore, in the early growth phase, it is necessary to develop a more diverse network in 
which weak ties may appear to be crucial to discover structural holes (Burt, 1992). These 
structural holes are important  to get access to new resource providers in order to fuel further 
growth. Thus they propose that network benefits develop from exploitation of strong ties to 
the exploration of weak ties. 
 
 
Three entrepreneurial processes 
 
In short, both strong and weak ties are useful and contribute to the emergence and growth of 
firms, although they are beneficial in different ways and at different stages of a company’s 
development. Therefore, the ideal entrepreneurial network includes a particular mix of strong 
and weak relationships (Uzzi 1996). We have distinguished three entrepreneurial processes in 
which network ties play a role. (1) The ability to discover opportunities: an important source 
of new ideas and lucrative opportunities may be the networks, in which the entrepreneur is 
more or less actively participating. Hills, Lumpkin and Singh (1997) found that about 50 
percent of entrepreneurs identified ideas for new ventures through their social network. In 
addition, in the process from idea to the actual start of a venture, prior knowledge (Shane, 
2000) and information (Fiet, 1996) are important. Both variables are closely linked to 
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networks, as network relations can be seen as ways to gain access to knowledge and 
information. (2) The ability to secure resources: providing access to resources is an important 
contribution of networks to the venturing process. Entrepreneurs rarely possess all the 
resources required to seize an opportunity. One of the crucial tasks in a new venture is to 
access, mobilize and deploy resources. This is a difficult task in the initial stages of a start-up 
with limited financial resources and hardly any ability to generate internal resources and 
revenues. Close social support networks (e.g. spouse, family ties) may provide the 
founder/owner with the resources (e.g. financial and human capital) he or she is lacking, and 
hence provide stability to the new firm in its early stages. Additionally, sparse networks 
facilitate the search for critical asset providers (e.g. investment and technology partners and 
key customers), who may offer the start-up further access to new resources. And (3) the 
ability to gain legitimacy: a network of a start-up may be helpful as it  opens possibilities to 
gain legitimacy. Gaining legitimacy is imperative in starting something that is considered 
innovative (DiMaggio, 1992). Start-ups are confronted with the liability of newness, or simply 
stated, young organizations face higher risks of failure than old ones. Network ties may result 
in getting associated with respected players in the field. 
 
Opportunities 
 
An important source of new ideas and lucrative opportunities may be the networks, in which 
the entrepreneur is more or less actively participating. Hills, Lumpkin and Singh (1997) found 
that about 50 percent of entrepreneurs identified ideas for new ventures through their social 
network. In addition, in the process from idea to the actual start of a venture, prior knowledge 
(Shane, 2000) and information (Fiet, 1996) are important. According to Fiet (1996: 429): ‘use 
of network may be viewed as a way of tapping into an information channel to obtain risk-
reducing signals about a venture opportunity.’ Both variables are closely linked to networks, 
as network relations can be seen as ways to gain access to knowledge and information. In one 
of the first studies on this aspect, Birley (1985) carefully documented how often entrepreneurs 
seek advice and feedback on the core ideas of their business plan, when they turn to friends 
and family for local issues, and when they use formal ties to look for financial support. The 
start-up was seen as an iterative process in which the number of informal and formal ties 
affected the success of the entrepreneur in finding a lucrative opportunity. The environment 
and the opportunities it contains are diverse and uncertain. The network of an entrepreneur is 
a source of information helping the entrepreneur to locate and evaluate opportunities. 
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Networks and in particular weak ties provide access regarding a diverse set of topics, ranging 
from potential markets for goods and services to innovations and promising new business 
practices. Weak ties are supposed to lead to a more varied set of information and resources 
than strong ties can (Bloodgood et al., 1995), and consequently weak ties enhance the ability 
of entrepreneurs to spot opportunities.  
 
Resources 
 
Providing access to resources is an important contribution of networks to the venturing 
process. Entrepreneurs rarely possess all the resources required to seize an opportunity. One 
of the crucial tasks in a new venture is to access, mobilize and deploy resources (Garnsey, 
1998). This is a difficult task in the initial stages of a start-up with limited financial resources 
and hardly any ability to generate internal resources and revenues. Close social support 
networks (e.g. spouse, family ties) may provide the founder/owner with the resources (e.g. 
financial and human capital) he or she is lacking, and hence provide stability to the new firm 
in its early stages (Brüderl & Preisendörfer 1998). Additionally, sparse networks facilitate the 
search for critical asset providers (e.g. investment and technology partners and key 
customers), who may offer the start-up further access to financial resources, production know-
how and complementary technology, distribution channels, etc. Furthermore, there is initial 
uncertainty about the growth of the venture and the resources it requires (Chrisman, 
Bauerschmidt & Hofer, 1998). In the case of staged investing by venture capitalists in 
technology start-ups, the amount of uncertainty about a venture declines as it survives and 
grows. One of the key survival strategies is 'asset parsimony' (Hambrick & MacMillan, 1984). 
The required resources need to be secured at minimum cost. Paying the market price for 
resources, such as labor, materials, advice and commitment is often too expensive. Social 
transactions through network ties play a critical role in the acquisition of venture resources. 
These resources can be acquired far below the market price, the entrepreneurs (as well as 
intrapreneurs) employ social assets such as friendship, trust, and obligation (Starr & 
MacMillan, 1990). In particular, network members representing strong ties are more 
motivated to help the entrepreneur than those with whom the entrepreneur has weak ties. 
Potential entrepreneurs assess their ability to get hold of the required resources at relatively 
low cost on the basis of their strong ties.  
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Legitimacy 
 
The third contribution of a network to the success of a start-up is the way it opens possibilities 
to gain legitimacy. Gaining legitimacy is imperative in starting something that is considered 
innovative (DiMaggio, 1992). Stinchcombe (1965: 148-150) has introduced the concept of the 
liability of newness, or simply stated, young organizations face higher risks of failure than old 
ones. Established organizations have a set of institutionalized roles and tasks, stable customer 
ties, experienced constituents, a surplus of capital and creativity (slack), and a shared 
normative framework at their disposal, all of which contribute to an effective provision of 
goods and services and their ultimate survival. New firms and novel organizational forms, on 
the other hand, are more likely to fail just because they still have to develop and acquire those 
prerequisites (Baum, et al., 2000). Faced with the aforementioned ‘liability of newness’, a 
new venture has to organize institutional support and legitimacy. This appears to apply 
especially to (relatively) radical innovations, where young technology companies need the 
endorsement of (some of) the prominent players in their industry (Stuart et al., 1999). In order 
to enhance their visibility and gain recognition, new ventures seek to obtain a prestigious 
business affiliate to build up a strong link with and eventually hope that, through this key 
contact, they will have access to new customers and partners. Furthermore, biotechnology 
companies in particular establish large supervisory boards with well-know industry experts 
and academics (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003).  
 
Suchman (1995: 574) has defined legitimacy in a broad sense as ‘a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.’ Aldrich and Fiol 
(1994) draw a distinction between cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. Understanding the 
nature of the new venture is referred to as cognitive legitimacy. It has to do with the spread of 
knowledge regarding the new business concept. To overcome this legitimacy barrier, network 
actors, such as competitors, distributors and universities, must be mobilized to create 
partnerships in order to achieve a wider understanding of the new concepts. The second, and 
related, type of legitimacy is labeled socio-political legitimacy and refers to the extent to 
which key stakeholders accept the new venture as appropriate and conforming to accepted 
rules and standards. Achieving socio-political legitimacy is particularly difficult when the 
new venture is very innovative and challenges existing industry boundaries. In those cases 
changes in the institutional framework are often required. Organizing socio-political 
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legitimacy requires collective action, negotiations with other industrial constituents and joint 
marketing and lobbying efforts. 
 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The research project contributes to the phenomenon of the ‘networking entrepreneurs’ in our 
Internet- and ICT-based society and to the institutionalisation of ‘networking’ in our network 
economy. There are a number of processes that indicate that ‘networking’, defined as the 
exchange of information and contacts and the wheeling and dealing between entrepreneurs, 
business partners and service providers, is not only on the rise in terms of its popularity, but 
also in terms of quality. Statements such as ‘without a good support network innovative 
entrepreneurs are nowhere’ are an indication of the social and economic value attached to 
existing and new contacts and partners within a strategic network. In addition to the well-
established technology transfer offices, large companies, universities and research 
establishments, and intermediary investors and service providers have set up so-called 
‘incubators’ to nurture new ideas, entrepreneurs and/or dynamic firms or to speed up product 
and service innovation and entrepreneurial growth in a controlled environment. where 
resources, services and contacts are easily accessible (Smilor & Gill, 1986; Richards, 2002). 
However, within the community of high-technology and ICT-starters there are also new 
rituals and innovative institutions, aimed at bringing together new ideas and entrepreneurial 
professionals that not yet know one another. In addition to the afore-mentioned ‘incubators’, 
there are also ‘virtual incubators’, such as Garage.com and Factory Zoo, that are trying to 
exchange contacts and business plans and establish global companies over the Internet. Also, 
the regular partner evenings and ICT-parties (First Tuesday etc.) and the rise of special media 
focused on information exchange and networking (e.g. bulletin boards/websites exclusively 
for starters, new magazines created by and for ICT-starters such as Red Herring and Tornado 
Insider) can be seen as illustrations of ‘entrepreneurial networking’. A very significant 
question in this context is, however, whether these networking activities, facilitated in part by 
ICT and communicated through Internet, do contribute to the success of that new company. 
 
This study is about nascent and actual entrepreneurship in the Dutch Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) sector and especially the role that is played by the 
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networks in which starters do or do not participate with regards to the innovativeness and 
success of these ICT-companies. The population of experts and professionals that are working 
at large companies or research institutes, recent university or polytechnic graduates, and other 
specialists in a particular domain (e.g ICT) produces nascent entrepreneurs (Van Gelderen et 
al. 2000). Nascent entrepreneurs are people that are seriously considering starting an ICT-
company, whether on their own or with others. In the process of founding and building a 
company the social and strategic network in which the starter operates or wants to operate 
(with the partners and means that the company presently lacks) can play a determining role in 
the growth and eventual success of the company. This research is concerned with the ones 
that actually did so, in other words young, small and innovative ICT-companies. These we 
define as companies with a minimum of 2 employees that offer ICT-products or services and 
were founded between 1990 and 2000. Our research focuses on the entrepreneur and his/her 
network of various contacts and links. Furthermore, our sample of young and dynamic ICT-
companies includes a ‘mere’ 30 start-ups and their linkages with relevant investors, business-
partners, customers, other entrepreneurs etc. It is, of course, also possible that the company 
does not value growth and expansion that much, being relatively content with the market 
niche within which it is operating. 
 
An application of the theory and practice of the ‘networking entrepreneur’ was found in the 
Dutch ICT industry. We constructed the networks of 30 ICT start-ups which were set up 
between 1990 and 2000. We interviewed the founders of 30 ICT/Internet-companies and 
through desk research we have sought to determine to what extent the presence or absence of 
such support networks have contributed in a positive way to the success of the start-up (e.g. 
survival, growth and/or profit). In that way we reconstruct the networks of all start-ups in 
‘mini-cases’ and analyse them on the basis of development phases (conceptualisation, 
foundation, growth, etc.). We have divided the 30 companies into 3 groups of about 10 
companies each, based on the extent to which these starting companies utilise a strategic 
network to start and build their ICT-company:  
 
(i)  the first category of ICT-start-ups, called the lonesome cowboys, includes companies that 
appear as if from nowhere and develop further without substantial support from a strategic 
network. These are ICT-starters that are being founded within a constellation similar to 
traditional companies: the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team initially sets out without 
network partners and at a later development stage may look for additional knowledge, 
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employees, funds and customer input (next to the conventional commercial and labour 
relations the company maintains with its customers and employees). Examples of lonesome 
cowboys are Annie Connect (call centre), Euronet (internet service provider), and Ring 
Rosa! (computer-telephony integrator). 
(ii) the second category of spin-offs and spin-outs consists of ICT-start-ups that in some way 
have been given support when they were founded from their former employer(s) (e.g. in 
training and coaching, housing, contract research, financing, etc.) Whereas in the case of a 
spin-off company there is no longer a direct financial relation with the company the 
entrepreneur has worked for, in the case of a spin-out there does exist a relation with the 
mother company, for instance in the form of a strategic participation in and/or 
collaboration with the nascent company. An example of a company that keeps sending new 
companies into the world is the national research laboratory CWI (Centre for Mathematics 
and Information Science), which since the early 1990s has created around 10 spin-offs, an 
example is Oratrix. Universities and large companies, consciously or unconsciously, can 
also serve as incubator for innovative ideas and potential entrepreneurs and generate spin-
offs and/or spin-outs; examples are HuQ Speech Technologies (Universityof Groningen) 
and Carp Technologies (University of Twente). Also established companies can churn out 
teams of employees that start for themselves seeking to commercialise the technologies 
they were working on previously. Examples of corporate spin-offs in our sample are 
Wellance (spin-off from KPN/Planet Internet) and Profuse (spin-off from Baan Company). 
(iii) the third category, that of incubator-driven ICT-companies, is created, founded and built 
within a strategic network of (potential) partners and professional service providers, 
created as such by a specialised incubator (e.g. Twinning). Thanks to this closely 
integrated and varied network or with the help of a strategic partner creating a virtual 
network, the start-up can develop further. Examples of incubators in the Netherlands are 
Twinning, Silicon Polder Fund, Gorilla Park and Newconomy. These incubators provide 
the ICT-start-up (in exchange for a share in the new company) with easier access to a 
number of important services, such as financing, housing and equipment/infrastructure, 
counselling & coaching, and information exchange & networking (contacts and referrals to 
clients, partners, suppliers, research institutions, etc.). Examples of such incubator-driven 
ICT-starters are Hot Orange, Trylian, and Gopher publishers. 
 
Each of the 3 groups will include at least 2 companies that were unsuccessful and that have 
faced bankruptcy. Although it is relatively hard to obtain the cooperation of entrepreneurs 
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who did not succeed, their findings are of great importance to our research. On the basis of the 
variations in the structure of the network and the type of relations they rely upon and/or they 
develop over time, we intend to develop propositions concerning the contribution of a 
particular network configuration to the three entrepreneurial processes, i.e. the ability of the 
start-up to discover opportunities, to get resources and to gain legitimacy. Thus, our empirical 
material can be summarized in a three by three matrix, three types of start-ups and three 
entrepreneurial processes. 
 
The research was explorative in nature and is aimed at generating hypotheses with regard to 
the influence of networks on the success of ICT-starters. Thirty entrepreneurs were non-
randomly selected from the databases of the Business Information Centre (BIC) at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, EIM, and Dutch trade magazines (Automatiserings Gids, Computable, 
Emerce). In total, 31 founder-entrepreneurs were interviewed (29 individually and one joint 
interview with the two original founders). 12 lonesome cowboys were selected for the study, 
10 spin-offs and 10 incubatees (see table 1 below). The interviews were semi-structured and 
lasted on average between 1 and 1½ hour. The in-depth interviews were taped and transcripts 
were made of them. On the basis of these transcripts and publicly available company profiles 
(obtained through desk research), 32 ‘mini-cases’ of the entrepreneur and their firms were 
made. In the final phase the mini-cases will be analysed and the findings will be discussed. 
Table 1: Overview of ICT companies participating in the study 
Lonesome cowboys Spin-offs Incubatees 
 
Annie Connect Bitmagic Bibit 
Co-makers Carp Technologies CareerFever 
Euronet HuQ Speech Technologies FactoryZoo 
Keekaboo InterXion Gopher 
Metrixlab Profuse Hot Orange 
Nedstat Proloq Information Innovation 
Planet Internet Tornado Insider Oratrix 
Rits Telecom Tridion Punt Edu 
Ring Wellance Siennax 
The Vision Web Xpertbuyer Tryllian 
Vocognition   
XOIP   
 
RESULTS 
 
Lonesome cowboys 
 
Lonesome cowboys start without a particular network within the ICT industry. They are 
relative outsiders and they benefit from some of their strong ties linked to their background. 
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These strong ties are in some cases family and friendship ties, but they also profit from 
relationships in their previous work environments. However, these strong ties appear to be 
relatively unimportant. The dominant networking activity is the exploration of weak ties. 
Most of the founders in this category of start-ups discover opportunities through their weak 
ties. Experienced (e.g. Nedstat) and unexperienced (e.g. Metrixlab) founders invested 
substantial time in meeting new people, going to conferences and participating in novel 
networking type of activities. Although some spin-off starters disqualified those network 
events (‘those meetings are for persons without a good network’), lone starter Metrixlab, for 
instance, benefited from the First Tuesday meetings and valued them in their search for 
valuable contacts.  
 
In most cases the business model of the start-up changed during the period of emergence. 
These changes were often inspired by discussion with acquaintances, such as people they 
recently met or persons they were referred to by relatively ‘distant’ friends. The networking 
could be characterized by the frantic search for people who could give information on new 
opportunities and the feasibility of the already spotted opportunities. The uncertainty about 
the tasks and strategy of these start-ups is extremely high and they were continuously looking 
persons who could provide information about the feasibility of their business model. The rate 
of new weak ties added to their network appears to be high, but at the same time these ties are 
dropped as soon as they realize that these persons are not able to give new insights. The rate 
of bridge decay (Burt, 2001) is very high. At the same time some of these weak ties developed 
into strong ties during the start-up phase. The role of strong ties, although limited in number, 
was to give ‘trusted’ feedback on the various stages of the business plan (often close friends 
and family relationships). These strong ties were often outsiders to the ICT community, while 
the weak ties consisted mostly of insiders. These weak ties appear to be used to get access to 
the strategic network of ICT and related firms in the Netherlands. 
 
Some of the weak ties during the opportunity discovery process developed into trusted ties, of 
which some appear to play an important role in the process of securing resources. For 
example, at Metrixlab a tie from a First Tuesday meeting became board member and 
connected them capital and technology resources. Similarly, founder of Co-makers developed 
some strong ties in their GEM class, which connected him valuable knowledge sources. 
However, despite the role of these ‘new’ strong ties, the older strong ties, people they know 
well from their previous activities, appear to be of more importance to get hold of the required 
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resources. Previous work experience and ties developed at university have been very 
important to get access to capital and human resources. On the basis of this limited number of 
cases we find a mix of strong and weak ties contributing to the resource acquisition process. 
Although the strong ties are in most cases dominant. Some weak ties developed into strong 
ties and simultaneously some weak ties were dropped because they did not provide sufficient 
value in the struggle for resources. This selection among weak ties is a process which appears 
to be less intense in the resource acquisition process than in the opportunity discovery 
process. Thus, the wild exploration of network ties in the search for opportunities evolves into 
a combination of exploration and exploitation of the network in the process of getting 
resources. 
 
Concerning the third entrepreneurial process of gaining legitimacy, the network benefits could 
be characterized by a mix of strong and weak ties. Although weak ties tend to be dominant, 
some also used their strong ties purposefully to get connected to reputable parties. Although 
some of these strong ties were part of their original weak tie connections and have developed 
into strong ties by the time legitimacy was crucial. So only very few ‘old’ strong ties were 
involved in legitimacy building. It was interesting to see that almost all of these entrepreneurs 
were aware of the importance of legitimacy. However, only about half of them were actively 
searching for persons or organizations to be associated with in order to gain legitimacy. These 
founders were also very keen on their public relations and were personally involved in the 
management of external communications, which was also used to signal their ties to partners 
with reputation in the field. For the start-ups without this active management of expectations, 
association with a well-known player in the field was always recognized ex post as being 
important for the growth and survival of their start-up. In these cases this legitimacy effect 
may be seen as a side-effect of their search for resources and first major clients. Most of their 
emphasis was on finding a respectable ‘launching’ customer, but connections to leading 
venture capitalists or major ICT companies, such as KPN or IBM were valued as well for 
their impact on legitimacy. 
 
 
Spin-off entrepreneurs 
 
The spin-off entrepreneurs in our sample were kickstarted and headed off for a fast early 
growth due to the in-depth industry knowledge of the founding entrepreneurs with many years 
of experience and the resources provided by their former employer, varying between capital, 
 18
tangible and intangible assets (easy access to patents and facilities), rolling contracts, and 
reputational benefits as a consequence of the association with the mother organisation. 
However, the status of being industry insiders and the almost direct participation in an already 
established strategic network (e.g. the Baan network with Proloq and Profuse) or an 
international research community (e.g, in the case of the academic spin-offs Carp and HuQ) 
piggybacking on the contacts and resources of the mother organisation, proved to be in a 
number of cases we investigated a blessing in disguise: while the spin-off firm had a number 
of ongoing commitments (contracts, patents/licenses) and strong ties (with a clear industry 
affiliation), it was relatively weak to develop new weak ties, and as a consequence, unable to 
break out from the complacent networks, it already has established. Just by this trained 
incapacity to pursue weak ties aggressively and cultivate a diverse network, spin-offs lack the 
drive of the lone starters to take major risks (e.g. experiment with new technologies) and to 
spot unseen opportunities (work with new customers and partners) and they may lose some of 
their initial advantages at a latter stage. This could be seen as a lock-in effect, or a path-
dependent development. 
 
Concerning the discovery of opportunities, clearly fall back on their source organization and 
their previous skills and colleagues for their pet ideas and projects they want to pursue. For 
some spin-off entrepreneurs, their venture is a hobby, a research experiment or a joint 
endeavour, driven by their interest, curiosity or simply, to work with their peers and 
colleagues (e.g. Planet Internet, HuQ, Carp). For others, their venture is a market niche or a 
technical application yet unserved by their mother organization (e.g. Profuse, Proloq, 
Tridion); there is also a category of start-ups attempting to exploit a newly emerging market 
(with some support), such as Tornado Insider, InterXion and Wellance. 
 
After the initial stages of discovering opportunities, the subsequent stages of establishing 
surviving and seeking growth, the spin-off entrepreneurs fall back on self-financing and self-
activation, next to (some) support from their mother organization. While most spin-offs 
remain close with their parent (as a kind of subcontractor or specialized supplier), hereby 
expressing a modest attitude towards growth (and as such do not have a major demand for 
additional resources and assets), the more ambitious spin-offs with venture capital 
involvement go for more (e.g. Tornado Insider, InterXion, Wellance and Tridion). Through a 
substantial investment and professional commitment, new skills are required, such as a more 
experienced CEO, professionalisation of the advisory board, and more money, and higher-
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powered customers and new regional markets are sought. While the former category still 
enjoys the coziness of a happy family life with the parent, the latter category of firms break 
away from their source organisaton and seek to diversify their networks with new and more 
heterogeneous contacts.      
 
In the final stage of establishing themselves in the market place, spin-off start-ups fall back on 
a number of tactics, such as a stepping-stone approach qualifying for one round of financing 
or subsidy scheme, or participating in business plan competitions and actively seeking 
publicity or joining all kind of professional and/or regional associations and affiliating 
themselves with VIPs. The dominant logic of these spin-offs seems to vary between simply 
functionalist reasoning stressing survival and cautiously preserving the partnership with the 
mother organization (e.g, the two university and the two Baan spin-offs), or focusing on 
operational achievements, such as quality, project execution and certification, or 
straightforwardly stressing their corporate successes (several rounds of financing, established 
strategic partners, large international customers, big events etc.).  
 
Table 2 Summary of  results 
 Discovery of opportunities Securing resources Gaining legitimacy 
Lonesome 
cowboys 
- Weak ties dominant, i.e. 
through previous jobs, 
conferences, first teusday 
meeting. 
- Limited number of strong 
ties 
- Mix with emphasis on strong 
ties. 
- Strong ties such as friends 
dominant.  
- Regularly these strong ties have 
grown from weak ties in the 
opportunity discovery phase.  
- limited number of strong 
ties. 
- in half of the cases active 
to get launching customers 
(with reputation) through 
weak ties. 
- also the side-effect of 
marketing or 
alliancebuilding activities. 
Spin-offs - Strong ties dominant, 
usually friends or former 
colleagues. 
- Ambitious firms use weak 
ties later on to search for 
information on opportunities. 
 
 
- Mix of strong and weak ties, in 
which the ambitious and growth 
oriented start-ups use weak ties to 
find not only opportunities but 
also financial resources and 
human resources.  
-  Some fall back on their 
strong ties with the parent. 
- Growth oriented start-ups 
use weak ties with for 
example clients.  
 
incubators - Family and friends as 
strong ties more important 
than incubator. Only intow 
cases, Oratrix with CWI and 
Hot Orange with Gorilla Park  
incubator plays key role as 
strong tie. 
- Usually first mix of weak 
and strong ties to discover 
opportunity and then go to 
incubator. 
- Remarcable that weak ties are 
dominant, also when when 
contacts through incubator. 
- In some cases (Factory Zoo, 
Bibit, Career Fever, Punt Edu, 
Tryllian) through strong ties 
(friends) and not through 
incubator. 
- Very limited role for 
incubator, who has limited 
legitimity itself  (Oratrix 
with CWI is the 
exception). 
- Mix of strong and weak. 
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Incubatee entrepreneurs  
 
The category of incubatees and their networking behaviour is more difficult to put into 
perspective. First of all, the incubator organisations with whom our incubatees were affiliated 
with, were all young and inexperienced (e.g. Twinning was established in 1998; Gorilla Park, 
Small Business Link and Newconomy in 1999), and busy with establishing themselves. The 
category of incubatees is the least homogeneous of the groups of networking entrepreneurs we 
distinguish, diverging in terms of opportunity recognition, mobilising resources and gaining 
legitimacy. While some have a clearly worked out business idea right from the start (e.g. 
Bibit, Information Innovation, Punt Edu, Tryllian), others develop in close collaboration with 
their incubators more than one option or actively experiment with new organizational forms 
(Career Fever, Siennax and Hot Orange). There is also a difference between start-up 
entrepreneurs which desperately needed the resources and referrals offered by the incubators 
(such as the case for foreign entrepreneurs in the Netherlands or student entrepreneurs) and 
incubatees who considered the assets and support network as something extra which was 
welcome but not desperately needed (e.g. Punt Edu, Bibit, Factory Zoo, Oratrix). One could 
say the same for the involvement of the incubates in gaining legitimacy:         
 
In a number of cases the incubator and the incubatee evolved together, helping each other 
wherever and when ever possible (Gorilla Park and Hot Orange); in a number of other cases, 
where resources, services and facilities were offered to the surprise of future ‘incubatees’ (e.g. 
Tryllian, Information Innovation) and opportunistically accepted (Oratrix), one could rightly 
question the added value of the incubator. Instead of offering their incubatees a Rolodex of 
business contacts instantly, the incubators had to roll out their network of services first, 
finding business partners and searching for capital and political legitimation, before they 
could actually help their start-ups. Already during the built-up of their infrastructure, they 
ambitiously and randomly started to select a large number of start-ups as incubatees, and 
promised them services, resources and contacts they could not yet fully materialise and 
deliver. Like their incubatees, the incubators themselves also lacked a track record and all 
kind of standard procedures. The supply of services, resources, facilities and contacts not only 
varied between incubators, but also within the portfolio of investments of one incubator: for 
instance, one Twinning company only marginally benefited from an early investment, and 
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another firm agreed on office space, a whole set of specialised services, and two major co-
investments.  
 
Some of the incubatees with proven entrepreneurial skills and an extensive industry network 
were not desperately in need of support by the incubator to seize business opportunities. 
Others, that were clearly less experienced, could find a shelter and some seed money from the 
incubator to promote their ideas and consider some market opportunities; in this case the 
incubator could not really help, since there were not any clear ties (neither weak neither 
strong) with established companies that could act as a partner or customer for the start-up. In 
the case of securing resources, most of the incubatees benefited from the services and 
facilities offered by and through the incubator, and eventually from the new weak ties they 
now had access to (although they disagreed whether the new contrats with law firms, 
consultancies, accountancies and investors were worth the money). The relatively unknown 
incubatees also could benefit from the reputation and the brand name of their well-known 
incubator, giving them quicker access to banks, investors and other service providers. When 
the incubators ended up in stormy weather in 2001-2002, the legitimacy benefits offered by 
incubators evaporated and some incubatees went bust or had to distance themselves from the 
struggling incubator. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Comparing the contribution of the mix of strong and weak ties for the lonesome cowboys and 
the other two types of ICT start-ups is revealing for our understanding of the egocentric 
uncertainty contingency. Egocentric uncertainty is relatively high for lonesome cowboys. 
They do not build on previous experiences in the parent company as is the case for spin-offs 
and they cannot profit from the incubators’ experiences about their business model. Thus, 
access to new information about other ways to build the business model is crucial. In the 
cases, we observed a frantic search for opportunities given by weak ties. As soon as the 
opportunity appeared to be less promising than originally thought, the weak tie was dropped 
and new leads were explored. The dominance of weak ties can be explained by the high level 
of egocentric uncertainty. The benefits of weak ties are much higher in this uncertain context 
than they would be in a situation of a stable and agreed on business model. In the latter case 
the emphasis would be on implementation and not so much on search for alternative 
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opportunities. Spin-offs staying close to the parent benefit from their experience and are more 
focused on transferring and combining resources to build their start-up. The benefits of strong 
ties are much higher in such a context of limited uncertainty than the weak tie advantages. 
Only in the cases that spin-offs want to break away from their parent the level of egocentric 
uncertainty grows and the benefits of weak ties increase as well.    
 
Concerning the contingency of time the results of the use and development of network ties of 
the lonesome cowboys category is significantly different from the network benefits to 
entrepreneurs as suggested by Hite and Hesterly (2001). In our sample of start-ups weak ties 
appeared to be very important in the emergence. There may be two reasons for this different 
finding. First, in our cases the emergence phase is dominated by the search for the most 
lucrative opportunity and not primarily focused on securing resources, while the focus of Hite 
and Hesterly seems to be on the resource acquisition process. Secondly, our cases of high-tech 
start-ups differ in the sense that they indeed take much more time to search for the best 
business concept (see also Roberts, 1991) and thus there is more focus on opportunity 
discovery and that process benefits more from weak ties than strong ties.  In that process ties 
are also less committed to the start-up and therefore the uncertainty and the associated risk is 
not that important as in the situation of being a resource provider.  
 
The argument of Hite and Hesterly (2001) for the growing importance of weak ties as the 
venture evolves from emergence to early growth is the need to find structural holes. Structural 
holes and the role of weak ties are related to the discovery of new information about new 
growth areas. This information and thus weak ties may be of importance to spot new 
opportunities. Of course this search process will benefit from weak ties, however, we observe 
that the weak tie benefit is much larger in the emergence phase and the related high level of 
uncertainty about the development of a business model that works. The difference may be the 
result of the degree of uncertainty at the emergence phase. Our cases of high-tech start-ups 
may be different from the average start-up.  
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